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I. INTRODUCTION 
Early in the morning of October 17, 2007, a computer hacker 
invaded the online systems of Thomson Financial (“Thomson”), which 
disseminates earnings reports and other press releases for publicly-traded 
corporations. The hacker began probing Thomson’s confidential files for 
an anticipated earnings release from IMS Health Inc., a NYSE company, 
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but to no avail.1 Repeated attempts failed to yield this material non-
public information, as IMS Health had not yet sent it to Thomson, who 
was to keep it confidential until 5:00 p.m. when the earnings information 
would be released to the investing public. Shortly after 2:00 p.m., 
however, when Thomson received and uploaded this information to a 
confidential server, it became vulnerable to the hacker’s final foray, just 
minutes later. Within twenty-seven seconds of the upload, the hacker 
broke through Thomson’s security system, and downloaded the 
unfavorable earnings report.2 
By 2:52 p.m., the alleged hacker, a Ukrainian citizen named 
Oleksandr Dorozhko, began purchasing $41,670.90 in put options of 
IMS Health,3 betting that the share price would drop significantly. 
Unsurprisingly, when the public learned of the information later that 
afternoon, the stock price sank almost 30 percent, at which time 
Dorozhko sold the put options at a net profit of $286,456.59.4 Given the 
suspicious and successful nature of Dorozhko’s trades contemporaneous 
with the earnings release, the brokerage house immediately froze his 
account and contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
“Commission”). Soon after, the Commission began a formal inquiry, 
eventually filing a civil claim for insider trading in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Southern 
District Court”).5 Those undisputed facts would appear to present an 
open-and-shut case of unfair trading on material6 non-public 
information—more colloquially known as “inside” information. 
The Southern District Court, however, held otherwise. When the 
Commission moved to freeze Dorozhko’s assets, United States District 
Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald ruled that the Commission was not likely 
to succeed on the merits of the case brought under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) given the status of judicial 
precedent in this area, and denied the requested preliminary injunctive 
relief. In sum, Judge Buchwald stated that Supreme Court case law 
                                                                                                             
 1 SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07 Civ. 9606, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *10 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2008). 
 2 Id. at *11–12. 
 3 “A put option is the right to sell a security at a specified price; thus, the value of a 
put option increases as the price of the underlying security falls.”  Magma Power Co. v. 
Dow Chem. Co., 136 F.3d 316, 321 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 4 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *13–14. 
 5 Id. at *14. 
 6 “‘Materiality’ depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place on 
the withheld or misrepresented information,” and is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry. 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988). The Commission recently established 
Rule 10b5-1, making clear that liability under 10(b) does not require the Commission to 
prove that a person actually used material non-public information, mere possession of the 
information while making a purchase or sale of a relevant security is sufficient to create 
the assumption of such use. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-1(b) (2009). 
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required the Commission to establish a relationship of trust or confidence 
between Dorozhko and either the issuer of the securities in which he 
traded, or with the source of his information. Without that requisite 
fiduciary relationship, no violation of the Exchange Act could have 
occurred. Judge Buchwald stayed her ruling to allow the Commission to 
appeal before Dorozhko’s ill-gotten gains were released from U.S. 
custody (and lost for good).7 
On February 27, 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
(the “Second Circuit”), without issuing a published opinion, stayed Judge 
Buchwald’s decision, and allowed the asset freeze to remain in place 
pending a determination of the merits of the preliminary injunction.8 
Until the Second Circuit determines otherwise, the status of the law 
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act remains as aptly stated by the 
Commission in their reply brief to the Second Circuit: 
[T]he principal drafter famously paraphrased the 
statute as ‘Thou shalt not devise any other cunning 
devices.’ Now, nearly 75 years after the passage of 
the Exchange Act, defendant offers a startling new 
reading of the law: what Congress actually meant is 
‘Thou shalt not breach any fiduciary duty; absent 
such a duty, thou mayest lie as much as thou 
wishes.’9 
Just as easily as Dorozhko slipped through Thomson’s online 
security networks to obtain confidential information, he also seems to 
have slipped through a loophole in U.S. insider trading law to remain 
entirely free of such liability. Even as courts use their creativity to stretch 
the existing precedent to its logical extreme, so long as there continues to 
be a requirement of a fiduciary duty and a breach of that duty, there will 
remain a significant loophole as evidenced by Dorozhko. Because 
information thieves and, notably in this era of internet commerce, 
electronic information thieves, owe no duty to the company about which 
the information pertains, nor to the source of the stolen information, they 
are able to exploit this antiquated legal framework to trade on the 
informational fruits of their crimes with material information unknown to 
the trading public. The regime as it exists today in the United States 
creates a paradox wherein those who have obtained information in an 
illegal manner may trade on it without fear of liability under the 
Exchange Act whereas those who have obtained the information in a 
legal fashion are prohibited from doing so. 
                                                                                                             
 7 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *16 n.6,*64. 
 8 SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 08-0201-CV at 1 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2007). 
 9 Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant SEC, SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 08-CV-0201, at 2 
(2d Cir. Aug. 4, 2008). 
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This article discusses the history and future implications of the 
status of this law as it now exists in comparison to the securities laws of 
the European Union (“E.U.”), which have effectively closed this gap in 
insider trading liability. Section II reviews the history of insider trading 
law in the United States, including the original intent of those who 
drafted the Exchange Act in reaction to the stock market crash of 1929, 
and how judicial interpretation of the Exchange Act has followed and 
expanded upon such intent. Section III discusses the securities laws of 
the E.U., and how E.U. legislators have updated insider trading 
prohibitions to defend against modern abuses in this area, in contrast to 
U.S. law. Finally, Section IV discusses the distinction between E.U. and 
U.S. law, and the implications of U.S. law as it currently exists. 
II. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INSIDER TRADING LAW 
In the wake of the stock market crash of 1929, the United States 
Congress enacted the Exchange Act, which notably contained Section 
10(b), prohibiting the use of any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in connection with a purchase or sale of any security.10 Many 
of the Congressional hearings prior to the passage of the Exchange Act 
centered around combating corrupt and deceptive practices in the 
securities industry, which Congress largely blamed for the market 
crash.11 Although more recent studies indicate that political motives may 
have been at play in exaggerating the presence of these abuses, there was 
ample evidence that corporate insiders were abusing their access to 
inside information to garner personal profits.12 
The Exchange Act generally defines one of its principal purposes as 
“insur[ing] the maintenance of fair and honest markets.”13 Similarly, in 
                                                                                                             
  10 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006). 
 11 JAMES D. COX, DONALD C. LANGEVOORT & ROBERT W. HILLMAN, SECURITIES 
REGULATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (5th Ed. 2006). For example, Senator Duncan 
Fletcher (D-Fl), the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency at the 
time the Exchange Act was drafted, declared that investigation into the securities industry 
exposed various corrupt practices including unfair methods employed by those in 
possession of inside information regarding “corporate affairs” which had operated “to the 
great detriment of the investing public” and contributed to investor losses. Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 73d Cong. Sess. 2 (1934) (statement of Sen. Duncan U. Fletcher, 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency). 
 12 Id. at 6; see also Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange 
Act, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 343 (1999). 
 13 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006); see also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) 
(internal citations omitted) (“Among Congress’ objectives in passing the Act was to 
insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence after the market 
crash of 1929. More generally, Congress sought to substitute a philosophy of full 
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of 
business ethics in the securities industry.”); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 
(1997) (“[The] purpose of the Exchange Act [is] to insure honest securities markets and 
thereby promote investor confidence.”). 
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establishing the subsequent and explanatory Rule 10b-5—commonly 
understood as the prohibition against insider trading—the Commission, 
acting under its rule-making powers as delegated by Congress,14 
explicitly stated that its purpose was “to assure that dealing in securities 
is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors.”15 
Despite these statements indicating a more general intent of market 
equality, much of the Congressional focus in drafting the Exchange Act’s 
prohibition of insider trading was on a more narrow concern about 
abuses by those in fiduciary relationships to the company with access to 
non-public information. 
For example, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking 
and Currency stated in his Committee Report that “[a]mong the most 
vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was 
the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of 
corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential 
information which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their 
market activities.”16 Additionally, he commented that “[t]he bill . . . aims 
to protect the interests of the public by preventing directors, officers, and 
principal stockholders of a corporation, the stock of which is traded in on 
exchanges, from speculating in the stock on the basis of information not 
available to others.”17 The Chairman of the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce similarly pointed to the abuses by 
fiduciaries in saying that “[s]peculation, manipulation, faulty credit 
control, investors’ ignorance, and disregard of trust relationships by 
those whom the law should regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless 
web. No one of these evils can be isolated for cure of itself alone.”18 He 
continued to stress this point in remarking that: 
                                                                                                             
 14 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 15 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 
322. 
 16 S. Rep. No. 73-1455, at 55 (1934). Fletcher also noted that the Committee was 
aware that directors and officers were not the only persons in possession of confidential 
information, and that large stockholders, who had sufficient control over their companies, 
were also to blame for “the unscrupulous employment of inside information” which was 
uniquely available to them.  See id. Thus, continued Fletcher, “[t]he Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 aims to protect the interests of the public against the predatory operations of 
directors, officers, and principal stockholders of corporations by preventing them from 
speculating in the stock of the corporations to which they owe a fiduciary duty.”  Id. 
Those owing a fiduciary duty were entrusted with money from the investing public, 
making their exploitation of confidential information particularly unfair. Recognizing that 
such “unscrupulous” individuals may continue to exploit their inside information “by 
devious and underhanded methods,” the Exchange Act would function at the very least to 
“tend ultimately to drag these devices into the open where they may be dealt with 
according to their desserts.”  Id. 
 17 See S. Rep. No. 73-792, at 8–9 (1934).  
 18 H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 5-6 (1934) (Rayburn) (arguing that the  “exploitation 
of . . . ignorance by self-perpetuating managements in possession of inside information” 
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A renewal of investors’ confidence in the exchange 
markets can be effected only by a clearer 
recognition upon the part of the corporate managers 
of companies whose securities are publicly held of 
their responsibilities as trustees for their 
corporations. Men charged with the administration 
of other people’s money must not use inside 
information for their own advantage.19 
Despite the stated intent of ensuring market fairness as generally 
described in the text of the Exchange Act, in the decades since Congress 
promulgated the law, courts interpreting insider trading prohibitions have 
mirrored the concerns of the Committee Reports, stressing the 
unwavering requirement that a fiduciary duty be breached in order to 
establish insider trading liability.20 There simply is no “general duty 
between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on 
material non-public information.”21 
Specifically, the Exchange Act prohibits one from using or 
employing “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” 
Rule 10b-5 explained further that it is unlawful for any person to “[t]o 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security.”22 Because there is no explicit 
prohibition of “insider trading” per se, the rule against such conduct has 
been inferred by courts interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-523 based 
on their language and intent. Simply put, a violation requires the 
Commission to establish three elements: (1) a “device or contrivance”; 
                                                                                                             
was to blame at least in part for the disastrous consequences of recent speculation in 
securities markets). 
 19 Id. Similar to Fletcher’s concession (see n. 16 supra), Rayburn admitted that the 
insider trading prohibitions were not “air-tight,” leaving the possibility that the 
“unscrupulous insider” may continue to exploit confidential information. However, the 
Exchange Act aimed to shed light on the abusive practice of insider trading, bringing 
these methods into “disrepute and encourage[ing] the voluntary maintenance of proper 
fiduciary standards by those in control of large corporate enterprises.” 
 20 See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (declining to impose 
a general duty on all market participants to forgo trading on material non-public 
information because  “such a broad duty . . . should not be undertaken absent some 
explicit evidence of congressional intent. As we have seen, no such evidence emerges 
from the language or legislative history of § 10 (b)”). See also Kathleen Coles, The 
Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 181, 184 (arguing for a move away 
from the “fiduciary-based rationale” to a “fairness-based system” of liability). 
 21 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
 22 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). 
 23 See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 
646 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 
(1976). 
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(2) which is “manipulative or deceptive”; and (3) used “in connection 
with” the purchase or sale of securities.24 
The focus of this article is on the legal terminology contained in the 
second prong of the prohibition, “manipulative or deceptive.” It therefore 
assumes that there has been a subsequent “purchase or sale”25 while the 
individual was in possession of the so-called “inside” information,26 and 
that electronic hacking qualifies as a “device or contrivance.”27 The 
Supreme Court has defined the term “manipulative” very narrowly in the 
area of securities law, generally requiring “intentional or willful conduct 
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially 
affecting the price of securities.”28 Thus, to fit an act of insider trading 
under the rubric of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 it must be 
“deceptive.”29 
Although the common understanding of the term “deceptive” would 
appear to include the scenario described above as perpetrated by 
Dorozhko, Supreme Court precedent makes it abundantly clear that a 
breach of a fiduciary duty, or some derivation thereof,30 must occur for 
conduct to be deemed “deceptive.”31 This interpretation stems from the 
historical understanding of fraud, which encompasses “deceptive” 
conduct, as implying a duty to “disclose or abstain.”32 In other words, 
any actor in a relationship of trust with another party shall either disclose 
                                                                                                             
 24 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *18–19. 
 25 See infra at Section IIB. As is evident in the chart of implementing legislation infra 
at Section IIB, the E.U. Directive and Member States have prohibited the passing of 
inside information even where there is no subsequent trading on such information; merely 
the act of disclosing the information is a civil or criminal violation. Given the potential 
conflicts in United States law, most notably with the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, this stands as another stark contrast to the U.S. liability scheme but is 
beyond the scope of this paper to analyze in depth. 
 26 United States law defines what is colloquially known as “inside” information to be 
“material non-public information.”  See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
 27 A “device” under the first prong is a requirement easily established in the 
circumstance of electronic data hacking pursuant to the Supreme Court’s definition as 
“that which is devised or formed by design; a contrivance; an invention; project; scheme; 
often, a scheme to deceive; a stratagem; and artifice.”  Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199 n. 
20 (internal citations omitted). Courts have held that electronic hacking to obtain 
information qualifies as an artifice or scheme, with the requisite intent. See, e.g., 
Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *18. 
 28 Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199; see also Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 465, 
476 (1971) (explaining that the terms “manipulative” “refers generally to practices such 
as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices that are intended to mislead investors by 
artificially affecting market activity”); Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 
6 (1985). 
 29 See, e.g., Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *20–22. 
 30 See Section IIA–B for a discussion of the various derivations of confidential 
relationships for purposes of insider trading law. 
 31 See, e.g., Zandford, 535 U.S. at 825; O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655; Chiarella, 445 
U.S. at 222; Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 470. 
 32 See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227. 
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the material information at stake or abstain from continuing the 
transaction. Growing from these common law roots, judicial 
interpretation of insider trading law now requires that a relationship of 
trust exist before an individual is required to disclose his confidential 
information, and thus before a violation of law can occur.33 Subsequent 
courts have become more creative in finding the requisite fiduciary 
relationships, expanding upon the “traditional theory” under which 
company insiders could be held liable given the fiduciary relationship 
they owe to their shareholders.34 These interpretations include assigning 
liability to “tippees” to whom information was given by a corporate 
insider,35 and even go so far as to include those who have 
“misappropriated” inside information, but who do not have any 
relationship to the company whose securities are at issue, instead 
breaching a duty of trust only to the source of the information.36 
A brief history of the development of U.S. insider trading law 
illustrates the difference between U.S. law and that promulgated by the 
E.U. Unlike the E.U. which had the unique ability to adapt its regulations 
to comport with modern technological and other advances, U.S. insider 
trading laws, and the precedent thereunder, are constrained by legislation 
adopted nearly eight decades ago. 
                                                                                                             
 33 See, e.g., id. at 228–29; Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, 
Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 34 Simon DeBartolo Group, 186 F.3d at 169 (citations omitted) (internal quotations 
omitted) (“Under the ‘traditional theory’ of insider trading, this prohibition is limited by 
the requirement that the defendant be under a specific duty either to disclose or to abstain 
from trading. This duty does not, however, arise from the mere possession of material 
non-public information. Rather, a duty to disclose or abstain arises only from a fiduciary 
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between the parties to the transaction.”). 
 35 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646; see also United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 320 (7th 
Cir. 2007); United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 593 (6th Cir. 2007) (“the Government 
was also required to prove that . . . tippees: (1) received material, confidential, and non-
public information from [the tipper] knowing that he was the source; (2) knew or should 
have known that [the tipper] breached his fiduciary duty; and (3) knowingly and willfully 
purchased or caused to be purchased shares of . . . stock based on that information.”); 
SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003); Randall v. Rational Software Corp., 34 Fed. 
Appx. 301 (9th Cir. 2002); SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that, to 
affirm a tippee’s liability under § 10(b), the SEC must establish that (1) the tipper 
possessed material non-public information; (2) the tipper disclosed this information to the 
tippee; (3) the tippee traded in the shares of the company about which the material non-
public information pertained while in possession of that information provided by the 
tipper; (4) the tippee knew or should have known that the tipper violated a relationship of 
trust by relaying the information; and (5) the tipper benefited by the disclosure to the 
tippee); United States v. Ruggiero, 56 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 1995) (“an individual need 
not have a direct relationship with the company to violate the securities law by trading on 
inside information; a ‘tippee’, one who acquires information from an insider, may also 
violate the rules against inside information.”). 
 36 See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642; SEC v. Talbot, 530 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 
2008); Simon DeBartolo Group, 186 F.3d at 171. 
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A.  The Traditional Theory of Insider Trading:  
“Disclose or Abstain” by Corporate Insiders 
The traditional theory of insider trading liability has its roots in the 
“disclose or abstain” rule at common law. In the landmark case of In the 
Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co v. SEC, the Commission relied upon the 
special relationship of trust owed by a corporate insider to the 
shareholders of his company to support its finding that a director of a 
securities issuer is prohibited from executing trades in such securities 
while in possession of information not yet known by the investing 
public.37 That duty arises from the existence of a relationship that 
provides access to the inside information, which is intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and the unfairness of a corporate 
insider taking advantage of that information by trading without 
disclosing it.38 Thus, it follows that those insiders must either disclose the 
material non-public information known to them because of their unique 
position in the company, or abstain from trading entirely. 
The “traditional theory” of insider trading law states simply and 
logically that a corporate insider violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
when he or she trades in the securities of his or her corporation on the 
basis of material non-public information.39 Trading on such information 
that is not generally known to the investing public, and which would 
substantially affect the judgment of a reasonable investor, qualifies as a 
“deceptive device” due to the relationship of trust and confidence 
between the shareholders of a company and the insiders of that company 
who possess confidential information due to their position within the 
company.40 Included under the umbrella of corporate insiders are not 
only the officers, directors, or other similarly situated employees of a 
particular company,41 but also the attorneys, consultants, accountants, or 
other persons who can become temporary fiduciaries of the company.42  
These “temporary insiders” adopt a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of 
the company for which they are providing services by virtue of their 
business relationship and access to confidential information.43 
                                                                                                             
 37 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, at 10 (S.E.C. 1961) (“We, and the courts 
have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them 
by virtue of their position by which are not known to persons with whom they deal and 
which, if know, would affect their investment judgment.”). 
 38 Id. at 912 n.15. 
 39 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id.; O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52. 
 42 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.16; O’Hagan 521 U.S. at 652; see also United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 565 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 43 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (“Under certain circumstances, such as where 
corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or 
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the 
shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons 
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In confirming this theory of insider trading liability, the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Chiarella noted its historical roots, explaining 
that at common law, fraud exists where affirmative misrepresentations 
are made to induce the reliance of another party or where the offending 
party fails to disclose material information prior to a transaction when 
that party has a duty to do so.44 The duty to disclose is found where the 
offending party is in possession of information “that the other party is 
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust 
and confidence between them.”45 Given the Commission’s recognition of 
a relationship of trust and confidence between a corporate insider and the 
shareholders of the insider’s company, the insider has an obligation to 
disclose given “the necessity of preventing an insider from taking unfair 
advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders”46 or simply when 
the insider takes advantage for his or her own benefit.47 Thus, the 
Chiarella Court stated that the “application of a duty to disclose prior to 
trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to 
place the shareholder’s welfare before their own, will not benefit 
personally through fraudulent use of material non-public information.”48 
In so deciding, the Supreme Court overruled the determination of 
the Second Circuit which had affirmed Chiarella’s conviction, 
disregarding the need for a fiduciary duty. Instead, the Second Circuit 
relied on the core principle that U.S. securities laws were supposed to 
have “created a system providing equal access to information necessary 
for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions.”49 In effect, such a 
                                                                                                             
acquired non-public corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special 
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given 
access to information solely for corporate purposes.”). 
 44 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–28. This case concerned an employee of a printing 
company who, by reading takeover bids being printed by his employer, deduced the 
names of target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella bought stock in 
the target companies, and subsequently sold such stock shortly after the takeover attempts 
were made public. For his realization of over $30,000 in profit over the course of 
fourteen months, Chiarella was indicted for seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act, and was found guilty of all counts. In overturning his conviction, 
the Supreme Court held that “one who fails to disclose material information prior to the 
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so.”  Id. 
at 228. Stating this in the reverse, one must affirmatively breach some brand of duty 
because he or she can be held responsible for fraud in connection with Section 10(b). 
 45 Id. at 228 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). 
 46 Id. at 228–29 (citing Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 
1951)). 
 47 Id. at 229. 
 48 Id. at 230. The jury instructions charged the jury with deciding whether Chiarella 
used material non-public information when “he knew other people trading in the 
securities market did not have access to the same information.”  Id. at 231 (citing R. at 
677). These were found to be erroneous, given the absolute requirement of a breach of 
fiduciary relationship. 
 49 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1358, 1362 (2d. Cir. 1978). This theory of 
providing equal access was outlined previously by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas 
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premise would have imparted “a general duty between all participants in 
market transactions to forgo actions based on material non-public 
information.”50 This theory, though embraced by legislators around the 
world in creating schemes for insider trading liability based upon general 
equality among market participants,51 was expressly rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Chiarella because the “[f]ormulation of such a broad 
duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty 
arises from a specific relationship between two parties, should not be 
undertaken absent some explicit evidence of Congressional intent.”52 As 
discussed above, such intent was heavily premised on fiduciary 
relationships. With the majority decision requiring such a relationship,53 
U.S. insider trading law irrevocably turned away from the notion of 
general fairness in the market place, a concept embraced by nearly every 
other developed nation,54 toward the more limited framework mandating 
a fiduciary relationship. 
B. Liability of Tippees: Expanding the Fiduciary Relationship 
The Supreme Court used this traditional theory as a jumping off 
point to extend liability to “tippees”, or those persons to whom a 
corporate insider has passed information, but who do not otherwise have 
any duty to the company about which the information pertains.55 In order 
to satisfy the fiduciary requirement, courts have adopted the theory that 
the tippee assumes the liability of the fiduciary relationship between the 
                                                                                                             
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding Section 10(b) “applicable to 
one possessing the information who may not be strictly termed an ‘insider’ . . .  anyone in 
possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, 
or . . . must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such 
inside information remains undisclosed.”). Additionally, this is precisely the reasoning 
accepted by Justice Blackmun dissenting in Chiarella, arguing that Section 10(b) does 
not require a fiduciary relationship. See note 53, infra. 
 50 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
 51 See Section IIIA, infra. 
 52 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. That the Court found “no such evidence” of a “parity-
of-information rule” in either the language or legislative history is unsurprising, given the 
heavy emphasis on traditional insiders of the Congressional Committees as discussed at 
Section II supra. 
 53 Justices Blackmun and Marshall, dissenting from the majority opinion, argued that 
the longstanding principle that federal securities laws are to be construed flexibly 
dictates, and that their purpose is “to ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal 
national securities markets where common-law protections have proved inadequate.”  Id. 
at 247–48 (Blackmun, J., Marshall, J, dissenting). The simple fact that the defendant 
“stole” information was “the most dramatic evidence” of fraud, thus formulating a far 
broader rule that those persons having access to information not legally available to 
others should be prohibited from exploiting such position by trading in the relevant 
securities. Id. at 246–51. “To hold otherwise . . . is to tolerate a wide range of 
manipulative and deceitful behavior.”  Id. 
 54 See Section III, infra. 
 55 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659–64. 
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corporate insider and the company when such insider passes the 
information along.56 In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court found that the 
tippee “assumes a fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the 
corporation not to trade on material non-public information only when 
the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by 
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should 
know that there has been a breach.”57 
For example, in United States v. Evans,58 a financial analyst at 
Credit Suisse, Paul Gianamore, passed along material non-public 
information to a long-time friend, Ryan Evans, who subsequently traded 
on that information for a handsome profit.59 Although Evans, the 
“tippee,” did not owe a fiduciary relationship to Credit Suisse, as a 
corporate insider Gianamore did, and breached that duty when he passed 
along material non-public information.60 Upon receiving the information, 
knowing that Gianamore had breached his own fiduciary duty to Credit 
Suisse, Evans assumed Gianamore’s fiduciary duty to the company’s 
shareholders and was ultimately found guilty for his trading activities.61 
C. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability:  
A Further Extension 
Continuing to expand the relationships that may qualify under 
Section 10(b), the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan set forth a 
“complementary” theory to the traditional understanding of insider 
trading law in the “misappropriation theory.”62 The Court held that a 
violation occurs when an actor misappropriates confidential information 
for the purpose of securities trading, in breach of a duty owed to the 
source of the information, rather than requiring a relationship to the 
shareholders themselves.63 As the Supreme Court stated, an 
                                                                                                             
 56 Id.; see also United States v. Falcone, 257. F.3d 226, 229–30 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 57 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. 
 58 United States v. Evans, 486 F.3d 315, 320–26 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 59 Id. This case presents the ironic scenario where the tippee may be held liable for 
insider trading while the tipper is not held accountable. Because the legal standard 
focuses on the tippee’s knowledge that the tipper is breaching a fiduciary duty—not the 
tipper’s knowledge that his actions constitute such a breach—a scenario such as this may 
arise where the tipper acted innocently and the tippee is the only party ultimately 
culpable. 
 60 Id. at 323. 
 61 Id. 
 62 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 63 Id. Although O’Hagan is widely recognized as the seminal case defining the 
misappropriation theory, the first time the theory was briefed was in Chiarella, where the 
Commission argued the requisite breach of trust exists where an outsider breaches a duty 
to the corporate insider who gave him the information, which would replace the breach 
owed to the market participant under the traditional theory. See Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *31–32. Although adopted by Justices Blackmun and Marshall in 
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“undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or 
sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty or confidentiality, defrauds 
the principal of the exclusive use of that information.”64 By moving away 
from requiring a relationship between an insider and the shareholders, 
the Court affixed liability to the “fiduciary-turned-trader” when such a 
person is entrusted with access to confidential information, regardless of 
any relationship to the shareholders, and breaches the trust with source of 
the information by trading on it.65 
In O’Hagan, the defendant acquired material non-public 
information in the course of representing the potential acquiring 
company in a possible tender offer.66 Prior to the public release of 
information about the deal, O’Hagan purchased call options67 in the 
target company’s stock, thus earning a profit of $4.3 million when the 
deal was made public.68 Despite the fact that O’Hagan was found guilty 
under Section 10(b) at the District Court level, the Eighth Circuit 
                                                                                                             
dissent, the majority refused to consider the theory because it had not been submitted to 
the jury. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235–36. 
 64 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. 
 65 Id. The duty of trust need not be owed to the original source of the information. 
See, e.g., Talbot, 530 F.3d at 1093. The courts have found that a “continuous chain” of 
duties may suffice to extend liability to information recipients who are connected to the 
issuer only through a chain of information passing. In that way, a defendant may be held 
liable when he owes a duty to the source of information, who in turn owes a duty to the 
issuer. See, e.g., SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 406 (former employee of a bank liable 
when he breached a duty to his employer by misappropriating information concerning the 
bank’s clients and traded on such); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(employee of a financial printing company liable under misappropriation theory when he 
traded on information regarding clients of his employer); SEC v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 
425, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (misappropriation theory applied to law firm employee 
who traded on information about firm’s clients). The Ninth Circuit has extended this rule 
in holding that there need not even be a “continuous chain” so long as there is a duty 
owed to the defendant’s source, regardless of whether the source is the “originating 
source” or not. Talbot, 530 F.3d at 1093 (finding misappropriation theory applicable 
where a board member of an insurance company traded on information about a lending 
service in which the insurance company owed a 10% stake when he learned of the 
information from officers of his company who originally learned of the information from 
officers of the issuer). 
 66 “A tender offer is a broad solicitation by a company or a third party to purchase a 
substantial percentage of a company’s Section 12 registered equity shares or units for a 
limited period of time. The offer is at a fixed price, usually at a premium over the current 
market price, and is customarily contingent on shareholders tendering a fixed number of 
their shares or units.”  SEC, Tender Offers, http://www.sed.gov/answers/tender.html (last 
visited June 5, 2009); see generally 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d); 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-e. 
 67 “A call option gives the holder the right to purchase a specified number of shares 
of stock by a certain date at a specific price. If the shares are not purchased by that date, 
the option expires and along with it the right to purchase the specified number of shares. 
For instance, on August 18, 1988, O’Hagan purchased 100 Pillsbury call options. Each 
call option gave him the right to purchase 100 shares of Pillsbury stock. Each call option 
also expired on September 17, 1988, if the option was not exercised.” O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 
at 612, 614 n.1 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 68 Id. 
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reversed his conviction.69 Following the Fourth Circuit’s lead in United 
States v. Bryan, which rejected the misappropriation theory,70 the Eighth 
Circuit accepted the defense’s argument that O’Hagan was not an insider 
of the target company, whose stock he had traded, and therefore the 
requisite fiduciary duty was missing.71 Noting the split amongst the 
Courts of Appeal on the feasibility of the misappropriation theory, 72 
however, the Supreme Court responded with another reversal. Expanding 
the fiduciary requirement to further protect investors against trades made 
unfairly with confidential information, the purpose of the 
misappropriation theory is to “protect the integrity of the securities 
market against abuses by ‘outsiders’ to a corporation who have access to 
confidential information that will affect the corporation’s security price 
when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to that 
corporation’s shareholders.”73 Soon after the O’Hagan decision, the 
Commission enacted Rule 10b5-2, further clarifying where a “duty of 
trust or confidence” exists.74 The regulation delineated which 
relationships would be encompassed within the misappropriation theory, 
and included instances where: (1) there is an agreement to maintain a 
confidence, (2) a relationship between the parties exists such that 
confidence is expected, or (3) there is a familial relationship.75 
With this decision, the Court continued moving toward imposing 
broader liability on unfairly advantaged market participants. Given the 
enduring requirement of a breach of some form of loyalty or trust, 
                                                                                                             
 69 Id. at 612. 
 70 Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995)(narrowing the scope of liability, despite “the 
principal concern of Section 10(b) [being] the protection of purchasers and sellers of 
securities,” because the statute requires “deception” upon a person in some way 
connected to a securities transaction, beyond merely a fiduciary breach to a source of 
information). 
 71 O’Hagan, 92 F.3d at 612. 
 72 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650 n.3 (noting the split between the Fourth Circuit in 
Bryan, 58 F.3d at 943–59 (1995), and the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
respectively in Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566, SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 
1991), and SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (1990)). 
 73 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. Given this stated purpose, however, the Court had to 
squeeze the misappropriation theory into the required framework of deceit in connection 
with a securities transaction through a breach of fiduciary duty. See Donna M. Nagy, 
Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: a Post-O’Hagan 
Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1273 (1998). Nagy argues that the Court’s emphasis 
on the harm to investors is misleading because the fraud upon which the Court relied was 
actually perpetrated on the source of the information with whom the duty of trust existed. 
Id. As this article argues, the Court is stretching the fiduciary relationship to its logical 
extreme to encompass as much unfair conduct as possible. In effect, however, the 
misappropriation theory, though disguised as a breached duty is simply a “backhanded 
way to penalize individuals for reducing investor confidence in the securities markets and 
for treating investors unfairly.”  Id. at 1274. 
 74 17 C.F.R. § 24010b5-2(b). 
 75 Id. 
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however, the misappropriation theory does not go so far as to impose a 
general scheme of market fairness. For a “misappropriation” of 
information to occur, there must be a breach, and for the breach to occur, 
the misappropriator must not disclose to the source of the information his 
intention to trade in the company’s securities.76 The Court, bound by 
precedent to uphold the fiduciary requirement, was well aware that 
scenarios would exist in which those with an unfair trading advantage 
would not be liable under Section 10(b). For example, Justice Ginsburg 
specifically mentioned a potential situation in which the source of the 
information was informed that the recipient planned to trade on the 
confidential information.77 Because there would no longer be a breach of 
the source’s confidence, this situation would yield no liability under the 
misappropriation theory. The Court merely deferred to the possibility of 
claims under state law to close this gap.78 Furthermore, some form of a 
relationship must exist between the source and the misappropriator, thus 
foreclosing liability for those without any association whatsoever, as 
would be the case for an electronic data hacker like Dorozhko. 
D. Implications of the Fiduciary Requirement 
The story of Oleksandr Dorozhko “highlights a potential gap 
arising from a reliance on fiduciary principles in the legal analysis that 
courts have employed to define insider trading, and courts’ stated goal of 
preserving equitable markets.”79 When the Commission launched an 
                                                                                                             
 76 See generally, O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642. 
 77 “[F]ull disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory: Because 
the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the 
source of the information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on 
the non-public information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no 10(b) violation.”  
Id. at 656; see also id. at 659 n.9 (“[T]he textual requirement of deception precludes 
10(b) liability when a person trading on the basis of non-public information has disclosed 
his trading plans to, or obtained authorization from, the principal—even though such 
conduct may affect the securities markets in the same manner as the conduct reached by 
the misappropriation theory.”). 
 78 For example, New York State prosecutes insider trading violations under the 
Martin Act, its Blue Sky Law. See, e.g., People v. Napolitano, 724 N.Y.S.2d 702, 708 
(1st Dep’t 2001); People v. Florentino, 456 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982). Rather 
than expanding upon the scheme of liability under federal law, however, New York Law 
essentially mirrors existing federal law, leaving the same loopholes available to true 
outsiders. See id.; see generally, In re Novich, 728 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (1st Dep’t 2001) 
(finding a “federal conviction for securities fraud . . . is ‘essentially similar’ to the New 
York felony under the New York State insider trading statute.”). 
 79 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *4–5; see generally Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (“The Court has said that the 1934 
Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace a fundamental purpose to 
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to 
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry . . . the Court noted 
that Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to 
be construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial 
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investigation, and eventually pursued civil claims against Dorozhko, 
Judge Buchwald of the Southern District Court effectively had her hands 
tied by Supreme Court precedent. While noting the availability of 
possible criminal charges for mail or wire fraud,80 or for hacking under 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,81 Judge Buchwald denied the 
Commission’s request for a preliminary injunction to freeze the profits 
made by Dorozhko on the IMS Health trades, finding that the 
Commission was not likely to succeed on the merits of proving a 10(b) 
violation. In doing so, Judge Buchwald stated that, 
in the 74 years since Congress passed the Exchange 
Act, no federal court has ever held that the theft of 
material non-public information by a corporate 
outsider and subsequent trading on that information 
violates § 10(b). Uniformly, violations of § 10(b) 
have been predicated on a breach of fiduciary (or 
similar) duty of candid disclosure that is ‘in 
connection with’ the purchase of sale of securities. 
To eliminate the fiduciary requirement now would 
be to undo decades of Supreme Court precedent, 
and rewrite the law as it has developed.82 
Notwithstanding Judge Buchwald’s assertion that no federal court 
had ever ruled in contradiction to her position, Judge Haight, also of the 
Southern District Court, had issued an opinion under extraordinarily 
similar facts just one year prior. In that case, SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd.,83 
the Commission alleged that the defendants, a Guernsey citizen and the 
Hong Kong company for which he worked, “fraudulently gained access” 
by “hacking” or “otherwise improperly obtaining electronic access” to 
material non-public information from imminent news releases stored on 
computer systems.84 Judge Buchwald did not ignore Judge Haight’s 
opinion, but noted that the Dorozhko case was distinct in procedural 
posture since Blue Bottle was a default judgment. Judge Buchwald also 
asserted that Judge Haight did not “produce[] an opinion analyzing the 
                                                                                                             
purposes.”); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 
(1971). 
 80 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006). Penalties for mail and wire 
fraud include a fine and a prison sentence up to 20 years. Id. 
 81 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2006). A first-time offender may be fined and imprisoned 
for up to 5 years; however, a second conviction under this title may result in a fine and 
prison sentence up to ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(3)(A)-(B). 
 82 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *4. 
 83 SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., No. 07-CV-1380, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95992 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2007). 
 84 Id.; Court Orders Temporary Restraining Order and Asset Freeze in SEC 
Emergency Fraud Action Involving Trading in Advance of Press Releases of 12 U.S. 
Companies; Foreign defendant garnered profits of over $2.7 million through illegal 
scheme, SEC Litigation Release No. 20018 (Feb. 26, 2007). 
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relevant case law, or why the theft of material non-public information 
amounted to a deceptive device in contravention of the statute,” thus 
rendering his judgment “hardly convincing.”85 Judge Haight did in fact 
publish an opinion in connection with the ruling, relying heavily on the 
Zandford and Dirks cases which Judge Buchwald also cited 
extensively—but the two judges arrived at precisely opposite 
conclusions.86 Without specifying whether the hacker was an “insider,” 
“temporary insider,” “tippee,” or “misappropriator,” Judge Haight 
outlined the relevant precedent and asserted that the Commission 
successfully established liability.87 In contrast, Judge Buchwald analyzed 
and rejected both the traditional and misappropriation theories of 
liability, ultimately concluding that Dorozhko was a complete outsider, 
without any requisite duty to either the stockholders of IMS Health nor to 
the source of the information. Thus, according to Judge Buchwald, the 
Commission was not likely to succeed in holding him liable under 
Section 10(b) for his acts of information theft and subsequent trades 
thereon.88 
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Commission argued that 
“Dorozhko’s hacking was deceptive within the meaning of Section 10(b) 
regardless of whether he breached a fiduciary duty.”89  The Commission 
argued that such conduct was “deceptive” because it was a “deceptive 
trick to gain access to non-public information as if he were one of those 
few persons authorized to have that access,”90 and because he had to 
“retrieve the information, and secretly depart from the compromised 
computer system.”91 Attempting to frame its understanding of hacking as 
“deceptive” within the meaning of Section 10(b), the Commission argued 
that this is not a radical departure from established law as Judge 
Buchwald had so firmly asserted in her opinion.92 Noting that each of the 
cases upon which Judge Buchwald relied involved a defendant with 
lawful access to non-public information, the Commission drew a 
distinction in Dorozhko’s case where the deception involved could be 
found in the means by which he accessed the information.93 The 
Commission argued that Dorozhko’s actions amounted to more than a 
“straightforward theft” of information, alleging instead there was an 
                                                                                                             
 85 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *52. 
 86 Blue Bottle, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *12–14. 
 87 Id. at *13–14. 
 88 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *63–64. 
 89 Brief on Behalf of Petitioner-Appellant SEC Motion for Maintenance Pending 
Appeal,  SEC v. Dorozhko, at 11 (Jan. 11, 2008)(appellate number unpublished). 
 90 Id. at 13. 
 91 Id. at 12. 
 92 Id. at 14–15. 
 93 Id. at 16–18. 
350 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:333 
added element of deceit.94 The Commission asserted that this situation 
was akin to using an expired magnetic identification badge to gain access 
to non-public information,95 similar to the facts in SEC v. Cherif, where 
the Seventh Circuit found the defendant’s actions to have deprived 
another person of something of value “by trick, deceit, chicane or 
overreaching.”96 What the Commission failed to note, however, was that 
Cherif exploited confidential information he learned as an employee of 
his former company to break in and steal information about forthcoming 
transactions.97 The Seventh Circuit stressed that he was not a “true 
outsider” as Judge Buchwald characterized Dorozhko.98 
The Second Circuit, without a written opinion, stayed Judge 
Buchwald’s decision, thereby temporarily allowing the asset freeze to 
stay in place pending a final decision on the merits of the preliminary 
injunction.99 The standard for granting a stay of the freeze pending 
appeal requires a lower standard of probability of success on the merits 
than does a preliminary injunction.100 Whereas the Commission’s request 
for a preliminary injunction in the Southern District Court required “a 
likelihood of success on the merits,”101 a standard not met according to 
Judge Buchwald, the standard for granting a stay pending appeal requires 
only “a substantial possibility, although less than a likelihood, of 
success” on the merits of the appeal.102 Citing this standard without 
further analysis, the Second Circuit thus recognized that there is at least a 
“substantial possibility” that 10(b) liability may exist. In addition to the 
likelihood of success on the merits, however, three other factors weigh in 
a court’s determination of a stay pending appeal, including whether the 
movant (here the Commission) would suffer irreparable injury absent a 
stay, whether the respondent would suffer substantial injury if a stay is 
issued, and whether public interests may be affected.103 Keeping the 
freeze in place would not inflict any further harm on Dorozhko, and there 
is a strong argument to be made that the public interest is served by 
prohibiting an alleged hacker from disappearing with his ill-gotten gains. 
Practically speaking, the Second Circuit may simply have been acting to 
preserve the Commission’s access to the funds in question, which 
                                                                                                             
 94 Brief on Behalf of Petitioner-Appellant SEC Motion for Maintenance Pending 
Appeal, SEC v. Dorozhko, at 15 n.6 (Jan. 11, 2008)(appellate number unpublished). 
 95 Id. at 16–17. 
 96 SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 411–12 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *41. 
 99 SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 08-0201-CV (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2008)(order granting stay of 
asset freeze). 
 100 LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 101 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *16. 
 102 LaRouche, 20 F.3d at 72. 
 103 Id. 
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otherwise would likely be impossible to recover should the freeze be 
lifted.104 Whether the stay is an indication of how the Second Circuit 
ultimately will rule remains an open question to be answered shortly.105 
This case presents a unique and novel opportunity for the Second Circuit 
to either solidify the existing law as explained by Judge Buchwald, or, as 
it did previously in its opinion in Chiarella, move judicial interpretation 
towards a fairness-based approach. 
III. EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION:  
FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS NOT REQUIRED 
A. European Union Directive 
In contrast to the precedent interpreting U.S. insider trading laws, 
European law explicitly seeks to achieve market fairness and 
transparency for investors.106 In doing so, the E.U. expressly declared 
that an individual simply may not trade on insider information regardless 
of how such information was obtained.107 Recognizing the endless 
possibilities of exploitation of confidential information in this age of the 
internet,108 the E.U. has created a statutory scheme of liability more 
encompassing than that of the United States with respect to electronic 
data thieves.109 Without any requirement of a breach of duty, the E.U. 
focuses instead on whether a person was merely in possession of inside 
information when a trade occurs.110 The legal disposition of Dorozhko 
                                                                                                             
 104 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *16 n.6, *64. 
 105 As of the date this article went to press, the Second Circuit had not yet issued an 
opinion on the merits of the preliminary injunction. 
 106 See Press Release IP04/16 Market Abuse: Commission Adopts First Implementing 
Measures, Brussels (Jan. 7, 2004) (listing among the priorities of the EU Directive to 
“establish a strong commitment to transparency and equal treatment of market 
participants.”). 
 107 Council Directive 2003/6/EC, Arts. 2-4, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 21. 
 108 “New financial and technical developments enhance the incentives, means and 
opportunities for market abuse: through new products, new technologies, increasing 
cross-border activities and the Internet.” Id. at L 96/16. 
 109 Of course, a scheme of liability is only as effective as the enforcement mechanism 
in charge of prosecuting offenses, and the existence of statutory liability does not 
necessarily mean offenders are held responsible. For example, between 1995 and 2000, 
there were only 13 successful prosecutions of insider trading violations across 17 
European nations. See infra note 111. Each nation places differing levels of priority on 
prosecuting such violations, as is evidenced by the fact that the Commission’s budget is 
almost 50 times larger than that of Germany’s federal regulator. Id.; see generally Utpal 
Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, J. OF FIN.,  75–108 
(2002), Table I (demonstrating the existence of insider trading laws in many nations 
which do not actively prosecute cases of such); see also Bernard Black, The Core 
Institutions That Support Securities Markets, 55 BUS. LAW. 1565, 1576–78 (2000) 
(arguing that viable enforcement mechanisms are critical for a strong public securities 
market). 
 110 See Section IIIB, infra. 
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and others who surely will follow his example highlight this point, as 
E.U. law would likely impose liability for his conduct. 
In January 2003, upon an overwhelming consensus on the need for 
clearer guidelines,111 the E.U. published an official directive on insider 
trading and market manipulation for the stated purpose of promoting 
investor confidence (“E.U. Directive”),112 explicitly outlining the 
prohibited conduct and to whom the prohibitions apply. Promulgated by 
the European Parliament and the Council of the E.U., this prohibition 
was required to be implemented in substantially similar form by each 
individual member nation of the E.U. (“Member State”) in its own 
national legislation.113 In order to effect a seamless cross-border system 
of enforcement, the E.U. Directive mandates that all Member States 
apply the requirements contained in the E.U. Directive to all actions 
carried out in the territory of the home state, or those actions carried out 
abroad when such conduct concerns financial instruments traded on a 
regulated market within the home state.114 Additionally, each Member 
State must include in its proscription of insider dealing all relevant 
conduct carried out in its territory concerning financial instruments that 
are admitted to trading in another Member State.115 Thus, under the E.U. 
Directive and the implementing legislation in each Member State, any 
act of insider trading occurring within any Member State is prohibited. 
Unlike the United States, the E.U. has soundly rejected any 
requirement of a fiduciary duty in favor of a straightforward rule against 
an imbalance of information in securities transactions. The E.U. 
Directive requires that Member States prohibit those in possession of 
inside information from: 
(1) Using that information, by acquiring or disposing of (or 
attempting to acquire or dispose of) any financial instrument 
to which the information relates, either directly or indirectly, 
and either for his own account or on account of a third party 
(“insider dealing”); 116 
                                                                                                             
 111 New Curbs on Insider Trading, Market Abuse Agreed to by E.U. Parliament. 34 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 432 (2007) (noting that the draft legislation won preliminary 
approval in the European Parliament by a vote of 398-3). 
 112 “An integrated and efficient financial market requires market integrity. The smooth 
functioning of securities markets and public confidence in markets are prerequisites for 
economic growth and wealth. Market abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and 
public confidence in securities and derivatives.”  Council Directive 2003/6/EC, 2003 O.J. 
(L 96) 16. 
 113 See Council Decision 1999/4681/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 184) (promulgating procedures 
for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission). 
 114 Council Directive 2003/6/EC, Art. 10(a), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 23. 
 115 Id. at Art. 10(b), L 96/23. 
 116 Id. at Art. 2(1), L 96/21. Where the individual involved in this situation is a legal 
entity, this prohibition also applies to the natural persons who partake in the decision to 
carry out the transaction on behalf of the legal entity involved. Id. at Art. 2 § 2, L 96/21. 
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(2) Disclosing that information to any other person unless 
such disclosure is made in the normal course of the exercise of 
his employment, profession or duties (“disclosing insider 
information”);117 or 
(3) Recommending or inducing another person, on the basis of 
such information, to acquire or dispose of financial 
instruments to which that information relates (“tipping”).118 
Much like the definition of material non-public information as 
commonly understood in the United States, inside information under the 
E.U. Directive is information that: (1) is precise in nature; (2) has not 
been made public; (3) relates directly or indirectly to a financial 
instrument or an issuer of such; and (4) if it were public, would be likely 
to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or 
on the price of related derivative financial instruments.119 
Importantly, these prohibitions apply to an expansive group of 
persons, far beyond traditional corporate insiders, including those who 
possess inside information by virtue of their membership of the 
administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer or 
through their employment or other professional duties, or by virtue of 
holding stock in the issuer.120 The E.U. Directive also includes those who 
possess inside information by virtue of criminal activities.121 In fact, the 
E.U. Directive explicitly stresses the importance of including those cases 
of insider dealing where the information at issue originates not from a 
profession or function, but from criminal activities.122 Additionally, as an 
expansive catch-all, the directive includes as potential insiders those who 
knew, or should have known, that the information they possess is 
considered inside information—termed “secondary insiders.”123 
Entirely sidestepping any requirement for a relationship between 
the actor and the issuer, or the actor and the source of his information, 
the E.U. Directive encompasses more conduct than would be prohibited 
under U.S. law, notably with respect to information thieves.124 Those, 
                                                                                                             
 117 Id. at Art. 3(a), L 96/21. 
 118 Id. at Art. 3(b), L 96/21. 
 119 Council Directive 2003/6/EC, Art. 1 § 1, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 23. The E.U. definition 
however, lacks the subjectivity contained in the U.S. definition, substituting the judgment 
of the “reasonable investor” for a more objectively defined effect on market price. 
 120 Id. at Art. 2, L 96/21. 
 121 Id. 
 122 “As regards insider dealing, account should be taken of cases where inside 
information originates not from a profession or function but from criminal activities, the 
preparation or execution of which could have a significant effect on the prices of one or 
more financial instruments or on price information in the regulated market as such.”  Id. 
at L 96/17 (17). 
 123 Id. 
 124 Council Directive 2003/6/EC, Art. 2, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 21. 
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like Dorozhko, would qualify under both the criminal and secondary 
insider provisions, making conduct such as his actionable anywhere 
within the E.U. 
Complying with the E.U. Directive, each Member State has 
accordingly enacted implementing legislation.125 Because the E.U. 
Directive did not specify whether it applied to civil or criminal penalties 
or both, Member States’ legislation vary on the penalties imposed. For 
instance, the United Kingdom promulgated criminal sanctions for insider 
trading violations in 1993.126 Although the United Kingdom only 
established civil liability in 2000, and thereafter revised the civil scheme 
to comport with the guidelines of the E.U. Directive in 2003, the criminal 
liability system has remained unchanged.127 Regardless of the differing 
penalties at stake, each of the Member States has implemented the 
requirements of the E.U. Directive into their legal schemes in some 
fashion to prohibit, among other things, insider trading.128 
B.  Implementing Legislation in European Member States 
A sampling of implementing legislation in E.U. Member States 
illustrates how the E.U. Directive has been applied on a national level. 
                                                                                                             
 125 See Committee of European Securities Regulators, Report on Administrative 
Measures and Sanctions as well as the Criminal Sanctions available in Member States 
under the Market Abuse Directive (Oct. 17, 2007). 
 126 HM Treasury, U.K. Implementation of E.U. Market Abuse Directive, June 2004 § 
3.4. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See supra note 125.  
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National Legislation Implementing the European 
Union Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider Dealing and 
Market Manipulation129∗ 
                                                                                                             
 129 Other industrialized nations have enacted securities laws which do not require a 
fiduciary duty per se like the United States, but still require the individual to be either a 
corporate insider or the recipient of information from a corporate insider to assign insider 
trading liability. See, e.g., Securities and Futures Ordinance Ch. 571, Law No. 12 of 
2003, § 285 (2003) (Hong Kong); Kin’yū shōhin torihiki-hō [Financial Instruments and 
Exchange Law], Art. 166 (2007) (Japan); Securities and Exchange Act of 1962, Act No. 
972 of 1962, Arts. 188-2, 207-2 (2005) (Republic of Korea); § 72 of Securities Services 
Act of 2004 (South Africa); Securities and Exchange Act Arts. 157-1, 171 (Taiwan). 
Australia, however, appears to be more closely aligned with the E.U. in defining an 
insider as a person who possesses inside information and knows, or ought reasonably to 
know that the information he or she possesses would be qualified as inside information. 
See Corporations Act, 2001 Div. 3 Part 7.10 § 1042 (Austl.). Thus, a “complete outsider” 
may be subject to liability even where there is no relationship at all to either the 
stockholders or the source of the information. ∗ References and authorities for this comparative chart are included as endnotes 
following the conclusion of this article.  
Austria:  
Financial Market Authority (“FMA”) 
Civilly Liable Conduct Civil Penalties 
The FMA has the right to seek administrative 
penalties for any violation of insider trading 
laws as defined by the criminal law.1 
Administrative penalties include the public 
disclosure of insider trading offenses.2 
 
Additionally, the FMA has the right to order the 
exchange operating company3 to suspend trading 
in a financial instrument at issue in an 
investigation of insider dealing.4   
Criminally Liable Conduct Criminal Penalties 
Any insider, whether primary or secondary, 
may not  take advantage of inside information 
before the public has knowledge of the inside 
information, by: 
• buying or selling the financial 
instruments concerned to a third party 
or offering to buy or sell these to a third 
party, or recommending such action 
with the intention of gaining a 
pecuniary benefit for oneself or a third 
party (“insider dealing”); or 
• making this information accessible to a 
third party without having been ordered 
to do so with the intention of gaining a 
pecuniary benefit for oneself or a third 
party (“disclosure of inside 
information”);5 or  
• using such information in the manner 
described in paragraphs 1) or 2) with 
Criminal penalties for primary insiders in violation 
of insider dealing or disclosure of information 
provisions include: 
• a prison sentence of up to three years, or, if 
the pecuniary benefit gained exceeds 
€50,000, a prison sentence of six months to 
five years.10 
 
Criminal penalties for secondary insiders in 
violation of insider dealing or disclosure of inside 
information provisions include: 
• a prison sentence of not more than one year, 
or, if the pecuniary benefit gained exceeds 
€50,000, the punishment shall be a prison 
sentence up to three years; or 
• a fine of not more than 360 times the daily 
fine rate as set by the court;11 
 
Criminal penalties for negligent insider dealing 
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Belgium: 
Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (“CBFA”) 
Civilly Liable Conduct Civil Penalties 
Any person who is in possession of 
information that he is aware, or ought to be 
aware, is inside information may not: 
• acquire or dispose of, or try to acquire 
or to dispose of, for his own account or 
for the account of a third party, either 
directly or indirectly, financial 
instruments to which that information 
refers, or related financial 
instruments);13 
• disclose that information to any person, 
unless such disclosure is made in the 
normal course of the exercise of his 
employment, profession or duties;14 or 
• recommend or induce a third party, on 
the basis of that inside information, to 
acquire or dispose of financial 
instruments to which that information 
refers, or related financial instruments.15 
 
Inside Information: Any information of a 
precise nature which has not been made 
public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one 
or more issuers of financial instruments or to 
one or more financial instruments and which, 
if it were made public, would be likely to 
have a significant effect on the prices of those 
Administrative penalties include a fine between 
€2,500 and €2,500,000.  If the infringement 
resulted in the offender obtaining a capital gain, 
that maximum shall be raised to twice the capital 
gain, and in the event of a repeat offense, to three 
times the capital gain.17 
the knowledge or in gross negligent 
ignorance of the fact that the 
information is inside information, but 
without the intention to attain a 
pecuniary gain for oneself or a third 
party6 (“negligent insider dealing”).  
 
Primary Insider: Any person who has access 
to inside information as a member of an 
administrative, management or supervisory 
body or an issuer or otherwise due to his 
profession, employment, duties or share in 
the capital of an issuer.  Any person having 
obtained inside information through criminal 
acts shall also be deemed an insider.7 
 
Secondary Insider: Any person who is 
informed of or learns of inside information.8  
 
Inside Information: Any information of a 
precise nature, which has not been make 
public and relates directly or indirectly to one 
or more issuers of financial instruments or to 
one or more financial instruments, and its 
disclosure could have a significant effect on 
the price of said financial instruments, 
because said information would serve an 
informed investor as a basis on which to 
reach investment decisions.9 
include: 
• a prison sentence of up to six months; or 
a fine of not more than 360 times the daily fine rate 
as set by the court.12 
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financial instruments or on the price of 
related financial instruments.16 
Criminally Liable Conduct Criminal Penalties 
It is prohibited to engage in any of the insider 
dealing offenses as defined by the civil 
code.18 
 
Criminal penalties include:  
1) a prison sentence of between three months and 
one year; or 
2) a fine of €50 to €10,000.19 
France: 
Autorite des Marches Financiers (“AMF”) 
Civilly Liable Conduct Civil Penalties 
Any insider, whether primary or secondary, is 
prohibited from:   
• using inside information by acquiring or 
disposing of, or by trying to acquire or 
dispose of, for his or her own account or 
for the account of a third party, either 
directly or indirectly, financial 
instruments to which that information 
relates;   
• disclosing inside information to another 
person, other than in the normal course 
of his employment, profession or duties, 
or for a purpose other than that for 
which the information was disclosed to 
him or her;  
• advising another person to buy or sell, 
or to have bought or sold by another 
person, on the basis of inside 
information, the financial instruments to 
which such information pertains or 
related financial instruments.20 
 
Primary Insider: Any person21 holding inside 
information by virtue of membership of the 
administrative, management or supervisory 
bodies of the issuer; holding in the issuer's 
capital; access to such information through 
the exercise of the person’s employment, 
profession or duties, as well as his or her 
participation in the preparation or execution 
of a corporate finance transaction; or 
activities that may be characterized as crimes 
or offenses.22 
 
Secondary Insider: Any person who holds 
inside information and who knows, or should 
know, that is inside information.23 
 
Inside Information: Any information of a 
precise nature that has not been made public, 
relating directly or indirectly to one or more 
issuers of financial instruments, or to one of 
more financial instruments, and which, if it 
were made public, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the prices of the relevant 
financial instruments or on the prices of 
related financial instruments.24 
Administrative penalties include: 
• an injunction to cease wrongful practices.25 
• emergency suspension (temporary) from 
professional activities for regulated entities.26 
• a warning, reprimand, or temporary or 
permanent prohibition from providing 
professional services.27 
• monetary fines up to €1.5 million, or ten 
times the amount of any profit realized in the 
transaction.28 
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Germany: 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (“BaFin”) 
Civilly Liable Conduct Civil Penalties 
In addition to criminal sanctions, Germany 
imposes administrative fines upon those in 
violation of the provisions prohibiting the 
disclosure of inside information and tipping.37 
Administrative penalties include a fine not 
exceeding € 50,000.38 
Criminally Liable Conduct Criminal Penalties 
No person shall: 
• to make use of inside information to 
acquire or dispose of insider securities 
for one’s own account or on behalf of 
another person (“insider dealing”);39 
• to disclose or make available inside 
information to a third party without the 
authority to do so (“disclosure of inside 
information”);40 
• to recommend, on the basis of inside 
information, that a third party acquire or 
dispose of insider securities, or to 
otherwise induce a third party to do so 
(“tipping”).41 
 
Criminal penalties include:  
• imprisonment up to five years;42 or 
• an unlimited fine. 43 
 
 
 
Criminally Liable Conduct Criminal Penalties 
Before the public has knowledge of 
privileged information, a primary insider may 
not:  
• carry out or facilitate a “transaction”29 
(“insider dealing”); or 
• communicate that information to a third 
party outside the “normal framework of 
his profession or his functions” 
(“disclosure of insider information”).30 
 
Before the public has knowledge of 
privileged information, a secondary insider 
may not: 
• communicate, directly or indirectly, 
privileged information to a third party 
before the public has knowledge of the 
information (“secondary insider 
dealing”).31 
 
Primary Insider: A person who, through his 
or her employment, obtains privileged 
information (either directly or through an 
intermediary) concerning an issuer of 
securities or the likely performance of a 
financial instrument.32 
 
Secondary Insider: Any person who 
knowingly obtains privileged information 
concerning an issuer of securities or the likely 
performance of a financial instrument.33 
Criminal penalties for “inside dealing” include: 
• two years’ imprisonment; and  
• a fine of up to €1,500,000.  This fine may be 
increased by up to ten times the amount of 
any profit realized, and shall never be less 
than the amount of that same profit.34 
 
Criminal penalties for “disclosure of inside 
information” or “secondary insider dealing” 
include: 
• one year’s imprisonment; and 
• a fine of up to €150,000.35 
 
If the information in question is used in the 
commission of a crime, such as where the person 
who was tipped makes a trade on the information, 
the tipper’s sentence shall be increased to seven 
years’ imprisonment and a fine of €1,500,000, if 
the amount of the profit realized is below that 
figure.  In such a situation, the tippee would be 
liable for insider dealing, and would be punished 
accordingly, up to two years in prison, and a fine 
of €1,500,000 or more depending on the amount of 
profit realized.36 
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For a person to violate either the disclosure of 
inside information provision, or the tipping 
provision, he must have become privy to the 
inside information: (a) by virtue of his 
membership of the management or 
supervisory body of the issuer, or as a 
personally liable partner of the issuer, or of 
an undertaking affiliated with the issuer; (b) 
on the basis of his holding in the capital of 
the issuer or a company affiliated with the 
issuer; (c) on the basis of his profession, 
activities, or “duties performed as part of his 
function”; or (d) on the basis of a conspiracy 
to perpetrate a crime. 
 
A person need not have any particular 
affiliation to be prosecuted for the insider 
dealing provision.  Thus, any person who 
violates the insider dealing provision is 
criminally liable for it, no matter how he 
acquired the information involved.   
 
Inside Information: Any specific information 
about circumstances which are not public 
knowledge relating to one or more issuers of  
insider securities, or to the insider securities 
themselves, which, if it became publicly 
known, would likely have a significant effect 
on the stock exchange or market price of the 
security. Such a likelihood is deemed to exist 
if a reasonable investor would take the 
information into account for investment 
decisions.44 
 
 
Ireland: 
Central Bank & Financial Services Authority (“CBFSA”) 
Civilly Liable Conduct Civil Penalties 
An insider, either primary or secondary, in 
possession of inside information may not, 
directly or indirectly, for one’s own account 
or for the account of a third party: 
• use that information to acquire, dispose 
of, or attempt to acquire or dispose of, 
financial instrument about which the 
information relates; 
• disclose that information to any person 
unless such disclosure is made in the 
normal course of the exercise of the 
insider’s employment, profession, or 
duties; 
• recommend or induce another person, 
on the basis of the inside information, 
to acquire or dispose of financial 
instruments to which that information 
relates.45 
 
Primary Insider: Anyone who possesses 
inside information by virtue of the person’s 
Administrative penalties include:  
• a fine of up to €2,500,000;49 
• compensation to any other party to the illegal 
transaction who was not in possession of the 
relevant information;50 
• compensation to the issuer of the relevant 
financial instrument for any profit the guilty 
party gained in the illegal transaction;51 or 
• sanctions imposed by the CBFSA including: 
a private caution or reprimand; a public 
caution or reprimand; a direction 
disqualifying the guilty party from holding a 
management position or having a qualifying 
holding in any regulated financial service 
provider for an amount of time to be 
determined by the CBFSA; and a direction to 
pay the CBFSA for all or a specified part of 
the costs incurred in investigating and 
prosecuting the matter.52 
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membership in the administrative, 
management or supervisory bodies of the 
issuer of the financial instrument; the 
person’s holdings in the capital of the issuer; 
having access to information through the 
exercise the person’s employment, 
profession, or duties; or by virtue of the 
person’s criminal activities.46 
 
Secondary Insider: Any person who 
possesses inside information and knows, or 
ought to have known, that such is inside 
information.47 
 
Inside Information: Information which is of a 
precise nature; relates, directly or indirectly, 
to one or more issuers of financial 
instruments or to one or more financial 
instruments; has not been made public; and if 
it were made public, would be likely to have 
a significant effect on the price of those 
financial instruments or of the related 
derivative financial instruments.48 
 
Criminally Liable Conduct Criminal Penalties 
The same conduct is actionable with both 
civil and criminal sanctions. 
 
If found guilty on conviction on indictment, 
criminal penalties include: 
• imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years; 
• a fine of €10,000,000; or 
• both.53 
If found guilty on summary conviction, criminal 
penalties include: 
• imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
twelve months; 
• a fine of €5,000; or 
• both.54 
 
Italy:  
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (“CONSOB”) 
Civilly Liable Conduct Civil Penalties 
An insider, primary or secondary, may not: 
• buy, sell or carry out other transactions 
involving, directly or indirectly, for his 
own account or for the account of a 
third party, financial instruments using 
such information; 
• disclose such information to others 
outside the normal exercise of his 
employment, profession, duties or 
position; or 
• recommend or induce others, on the 
basis of such information, to carry out 
any of the transactions referred to in 
subparagraph 1).  
Primary Insider:  A person who possesses 
inside information by virtue of his 
membership of the administrative, 
management or supervisory bodies of an 
Administrative penalties include: 
• a sanction of between €100,000 to 
€15,000,000;59 
• temporary disqualification from position as 
corporate officer or shareholder of authorized 
intermediaries, market management 
companies, auditors and financial salesmen.60 
• an order from CONSOB to authorized 
intermediaries, market management 
companies, listed issuers and auditing firms 
not to use the offender in the exercise of their 
activities for a period of not more than three 
years and may request that the competent 
professional associations suspend the 
registrant from practice of the profession.61 
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issuer, his holding in the capital of an issuer, 
or the exercise of his employment, 
profession, duties.55  Additionally, this 
category includes any person who possesses 
inside information by virtue of the 
preparation of execution of criminal 
activities.56 
 
Secondary Insider: Any person who, 
possessing inside information, and knowing 
or capable of knowing through ordinary 
diligence its inside nature, carries out any of 
the actions described above.57 
  
Inside Information:  Information of a precise 
nature which has not been made public 
relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more 
issuers of financial instruments or one or 
more financial instruments and which, if it 
were made public, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the prices of those 
financial instruments.  This includes 
information a reasonable investor would be 
likely to use as part of the basis of his 
investment decisions.58 
 
Criminally Liable Conduct Criminal Penalties 
The same conduct is actionable with both 
civil and criminal sanctions.62  Criminal law, 
however, does not penalize offenses by 
secondary insiders.63 
I Criminal penalties for any of the proscribed 
activities include: 
• imprisonment for two to twelve years;  
• a fine of €40,000 to €6,000,000;64 
• confiscation of the proceeds of the crime or 
the profit therefrom and the funds used to 
commit the crime;65 or 
ban from the securities profession, holding public 
office, or exercising powers as a director, auditor, 
receiver, general manager, or any other business 
office.66 
  
 
United Kingdom: 
Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) 
Civilly Liable Conduct Civil Penalties 
An insider may not:   
• deal (or attempt to deal) on the basis of 
inside information relating to the 
investment in question;  
• disclose inside information to another 
person, other than in the proper course 
of one’s employment; or 
 
Anyone, whether or not an insider, may not: 
• base behavior on information not 
generally available to those using the 
market, but which, if available to a 
regular user of the market, would likely 
to be regarded as relevant to the market 
decisions.  The behavior also must be 
likely to be regarded by a regular user 
Administrative penalties include: 
• imposition by the FSA of “a penalty of such 
amount as it considers appropriate”.70 
• a statement published by the FSA that the 
person or entity has engaged in such 
prohibited behavior.71  Any statement 
published would be done in such a way as to 
bring it to the attention of the public.72 
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of the market as a failure to observe the 
standard of behavior reasonably 
expected of a person in his position.67 
 
Insider:  Anyone who has information: (1) as 
a result of his membership of an 
administrative, management, or supervisory 
body of an issuer; (2) as a result of his status 
as a shareholder; (3) as a result of having 
access to the information by means of his 
employment; (4) as a result of criminal 
activities; or (4) which he has obtained by 
other means, and which he could be 
reasonably expected to know is insider 
information.68 
   
Insider Information: Information that: (1) is 
precise in nature; (2) is not generally 
available; (3) relates either directly or 
indirectly to an issuer or investment; and (4) 
is likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of related investments, if it were to be 
generally available.69 
 
Criminally Liable Conduct Criminal Penalties 
A “person having information as an insider” 
may not: 
• deal in securities that are price-affected 
securities in relation to the information, 
on a regulated market, through a 
professional intermediary, or as a 
professional intermediary; 
• encourage another person to deal in 
price-affected securities in relation to 
the information, having reasonable 
cause to believe that the dealing would 
take place on a regulated market or 
through a professional intermediary; 
• disclose the information to another 
person, other than in the proper 
performance of one’s employment.73 
  
Person Having Information as an Insider: A 
person who knows that the information he 
possesses would be considered inside 
information, and either he or his source 
(which can be direct or indirect) obtained 
such information from being a director, 
employee, or shareholder of a securities 
issuer, or from having access to the 
information by virtue or his employment or 
profession.74 
 
Inside Information:  Information which: (1) 
relates to particular securities or issuers of 
securities (or that issuer’s business 
prospects); (2) is specific or precise in nature; 
(3) has not been made public; and (4) if it 
were to be made public, would be likely to 
have a significant effect on the price or value 
of securities.75 
If found guilty on conviction on indictment, 
criminal penalties include: 
• a fine; 
• a term of imprisonment up to seven years; or 
• both.76 
 
If found guilty of insider dealing on summary 
conviction, criminal penalties include: 
• a fine; 
• a term of imprisonment up to 6 months; or 
• both.77 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS IN UNITED STATES ENFORCEMENT 
In contrast to European law, U.S. courts focus on the existence of 
some form of fiduciary relationship rather than market fairness, creating 
a conspicuous hole in the enforcement of insider trading laws. The 
regime has created the paradoxical situation wherein an individual who 
has obtained material non-public information in a legal manner may be 
held criminally and civilly liable for trading on such information, while 
one who has obtained the information in an illegal manner is entirely free 
of U.S. insider trading liability. This anomaly, labeled by Judge 
Buchwald in her Dorozhko opinion as the “inconvenient truth” of our 
securities laws,130 has been and will continue to be exploited by 
information thieves who apparently can trade on such information 
without fear of reproach under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability.131 
In this age of the internet, where information can be broadcast around the 
world with the click of a button, or accessed by hackers skilled enough to 
steal the information prior to broadcast, this loophole will continue to be 
exploited. 
In recent years, the Commission has brought suit in at least one 
other instance in which it alleged that individuals acquired and exploited 
material non-public information through acts of electronic theft.132 In 
SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viiseman, the Commission alleged that 
individual defendants Peek and Lepik, employees of co-defendant 
Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, an Estonian financial services firm, were 
engaging in a fraudulent scheme using a “spider” program to troll for 
secure, password-protected confidential information through the website 
of Business Wire, a leading distributor of regulatory filings and news 
releases for companies throughout the world.133 Through their electronic 
activity, the defendants were alleged to have accessed more than 360 
confidential press releases about mergers, earnings announcements and 
regulatory actions, from more than 200 public companies.134 This 
                                                                                                             
 130 Dorozhko, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, at *5. 
 131 Such hackers may still be liable under mail or wire fraud, and the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act. See Section IID. These charges, however, would need to be pursued by 
the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), not the Commission. Although a crime 
may have been committed in the actual theft of the information, the trade itself, as 
discussed in this article, is not actionable.  
 132 SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viiseman, No. 05-9259, 2005 WL 3309748 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 133 SEC Litigation Release No. 19450 (Nov. 1, 2005), available online at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19450.htm (last visited June 5, 2009); 
Complaint in SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viisemenn, No. 05-CV-9259, (Nov. 1, 2005), 
available online at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp19450.pdf (last visited 
June 5, 2009). 
 134 Id. 
364 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 5:333 
information allegedly enabled the defendants to “strategically time” their 
stock positions around the public release of their previously acquired 
information, resulting in gains in the millions of dollars.135 The 
Commission’s allegations relied entirely on violations of Section 10(b) 
of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.136 
Ultimately, without admitting or denying the Commission’s 
allegations, the defendants reached a settlement in which Peek and Lepik 
agreed to disgorge $13,000,000 and $566,958, respectively, representing 
their ill-gotten gains from the alleged scheme, in addition to civil 
penalties of $1,350,000 and $15,000 respectively.137 Additionally, 
Lohmus, Haavel & Viiseman consented to a civil penalty of $650,000.138 
Despite this apparent victory for the Commission, the subsequent 
and explicit precedent of Dorozhko will open the door for future 
information thieves to exploit this method of profitable trading.  Stories 
already are appearing on the Internet, advertising the ease with which 
profits can be made in this way, and the unlikelihood of federal charges 
or civil claims based on insider trading.139 The fact remains that those 
who obtain material non-public information in a lawful manner may be 
held liable for a subsequent trade on such information, while those who 
actively and criminally steal such information and perform the same 
trade are entirely free from insider trading liability, is a contradiction 
which will continue to be exploited. Such a paradox effectively has been 
remedied by European jurisdictions, whose laws close this loophole. 
Commentators have argued that the Commission could promulgate 
further regulations interpreting Section 10(b) to define more explicitly 
the boundaries of prohibited conduct.140 Regulations issued by the 
Commission as an administrative agency of the Executive Branch, 
however, may not extend beyond the confines of Section 10(b) itself in 
terms of scope or authority, as set by Congress and defined by the 
judiciary.141 Given the Supreme Court’s explicit determination that the 
                                                                                                             
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 SEC Litigation Release. No. 20134 (May 31, 2007) available online at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20134.htm; SEC Litigation Release 
No.19810 (Aug. 22, 2006), available online at http://www.sec.gov/litigation 
/litreleases/2006/lr19810.htm (last visited June 5, 2009). 
 138 Id. 
 139 See, e.g., How to Beat an Insider Trading Rap at IB, http://www.elitetrader.com/ 
vb/showthread.php?threadid=132761 (last visited June 5, 2009); Gaming the Market: 
How to Beat an Insider Trading Rap, http://www.gamingthemarket.com/2008/06/how-to-
beat-an-insider-trading-rap.html ) (last visited June 5, 2009). 
 140 See Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 611 (2008) (arguing that 
the Commission could promulgate another rule pertaining to insider trading liability in 
the context of illegally obtained information, more clearly specify the bounds of the 
prohibition, or create a “general parity-of-access rule”). 
 141 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651 (“Liability under Rule 10b-5 . . . does not extend 
beyond conduct encompassed by § 10(b)’s prohibition.”); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 
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Exchange Act mandates a fiduciary duty, it is unlikely that a 
Commission rule could withstand judicial scrutiny should it go so far as 
to extend liability over those defendants with no fiduciary relationship at 
all. 
Similarly, short of an outright reversal by the Supreme Court, 
judicial interpretation disposing of the fiduciary duty requirement is 
unlikely to pass scrutiny. The Second Circuit currently has the 
opportunity to diverge from precedent in finding Dorozhko liable for his 
trades despite his lack of any duty to either the issuer or source of 
information. Such an action, however, is unlikely given the explicit 
instructions of the Supreme Court as discussed in Section II. Even if the 
Second Circuit takes a renegade approach in moving toward a scheme of 
market fairness under the Exchange Act as it did in Chiarella,142 it is 
likely the Supreme Court’s reaction would be the same in rejecting “a 
general duty between all participants in market transactions to forego 
actions based on material non-public information.”143 
Of course, Congress itself could take action in updating Section 
10(b) to clarify the law and dispose of the fiduciary requirement.144 As 
discussed in Section II above, the Exchange Act itself was largely a 
reaction to the perceived corruption in the securities markets. In another 
era of several high profile insider trading scandals during the eighties, a 
bill entitled the “Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987” was 
proposed by Senators Alfonso D’Amato (R-N.Y.) and Donald Riegle (D-
Mich.),145 which would have codified an expanded definition of insider 
trading.146 The definition would have explained that “information shall 
have been used or obtained wrongfully only if it has been obtained by, or 
its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, theft, conversion, 
                                                                                                             
213–14 (internal quotations omitted) (“Rule 10b-5 was adopted pursuant to authority 
granted the Commission under § 10(b). The rulemaking power granted to an 
administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the 
power to make law. Rather, it is the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the 
will of Congress as expressed by the statute.”). 
 142 Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1362. 
 143 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
 144 See Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. Krawiec, and Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t 
Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 
(1998)(explaining that confusion surrounds the requirement of “fiduciary duties having 
nothing to do with corporate law,” and that lack of clear definitions in the enforcement 
scheme should be remedied by an amendment to Section 10(b)); John I. McMahon, Jr., A 
Statutory Definition of Insider Trading: The Need to Codify the Misappropriation 
Theory, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 985, 1026 (1988) (arguing that, in the wake of the failed 
Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987 and the Commission’s accompanying 
proposals, a definitive legislative statement is necessary to clarify the law). 
 145 Roberta S. Karmel, Insider Trading: Law, Policy, and Theory after O’Hagan: 
Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—a Breach In Search of a Duty, 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 98–101 (1998) (explaining statutory developments pertaining to 
insider trading law throughout the 1980’s). 
 146 S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987) reprinted in S. Hrg. 100-155, pt. 1, at 74 (1987). 
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misappropriation or a breach of fiduciary, contractual, employment, 
personal, or other relationship of trust and confidence.”147 
The Commission objected to this definition, concerned that it would 
limit its enforcement powers.148 The Commission responded with its own 
proposed “Insider Trading Act of 1987,”149 stating that “[t]he fairness, 
efficiency and integrity of the nation’s securities markets are impaired 
when corporate insiders or other persons who obtain material non-public 
information relating to an issuer or its securities wrongfully trade, or 
wrongfully cause the trading of, securities while in possession of that 
information.”150 With this goal, the Commission proposed that Section 
10(b) be amended by adding that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, to purchase [or] sell . . . any security while in 
possession of material non-public information concerning the issuer or 
its securities, if such person knows or recklessly disregards that such 
information has been obtained” through a breach of duty,151 or, most 
notably, through “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, or espionage through 
electronic or other means.”152 Following Congressional hearings, the 
Commission submitted a revised bill with similar language,153 but the 
                                                                                                             
 147 Id. 
 148 See Steinbuch, supra note 140, at 612. 
 149 Text of Draft “Insider Trading Act of 1987” submitted by SEC, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1284 (Aug. 14, 1987). 
 150 Id. at § 2(1). 
 151 Such duty may arise from any fiduciary, contractual, employment, personal or 
other relationship with: (a) the issuer of the security or its security holders; (c) any person 
planning or engaged in an acquisition or disposition of the issuer’s securities or assets; (c) 
any government, or a political subdivision, agency or instrumentality of a government; 
(d) any person, or any self-regulatory organization, registered or required to be registered 
with the Commission under any provision of the federal securities laws; (e) any person 
engaged in the business of gathering, analyzing, of disseminating information concerning 
securities, the markets for securities, or the financial condition of issuers; (f) any other 
person that is a member of a class that the Commission designates, by rule or regulation, 
where the Commission finds (i) that the activities of the members of such class have a 
regular nexus to the operation of the nation’s securities markets, and (ii) that such 
designation is necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Section; or (g) 
any other person who obtained such information as a result of a direct or indirect 
confidential relationship with any of the persons or entities referred to in the previous 
categories. Id. at § 3(a)(2). 
 152 Id. at § 3(a)(1). 
 153 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27, 1987), Section (b)(1) (“It shall be 
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or 
sale of, any security, while in possession of material, non-public information relating 
thereto, if such person knows or recklessly disregards that such information has been 
obtained wrongfully, or that such purchase or sale would constitute a wrongful use of 
such information. For the purposes of this subsection, such trading while in possession of 
material, non-public information is wrongful only if such information has been obtained 
by, or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A) theft, bribery misrepresentation, 
espionage (through electric or other means) or (B) conversion, misappropriation, or any 
other breach of a fiduciary duty, breach of any personal or other relationship of trust and 
confidence, or breach of any contractual or employment relationship.”). 
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definition proved too controversial, and no further steps were taken with 
respect to the bill.154 No further attempts by Congress or the Commission 
have been made to update the laws since. The proposed definitions, 
however, are remarkably similar to those eventually adopted by the E.U., 
and would have covered cases such as Dorozhko and Blue Bottle. 
As with the Exchange Act, the proposed Insider Trading 
Proscriptions Act, and the recent and hotly-debated Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
promulgated in the wake of a mass of corporate scandals, the slow but 
heavy hand of Congress waits for public outrage at corporate corruption 
to push it into action.155 Whether cases such as Dorozhko, or more likely 
those who will inevitably follow his lead to garner far larger profits, will 
incite public outcry remains a question for the future. In the meantime, in 
stark contrast to the laws of the E.U., the winding path of judicial 
interpretation in the United States will continue to “define” insider 
trading based on the existence of a fiduciary duty until Congress adopts 
legislation substantially similar to its previous proposals, or which at 
least includes more clearly delineated definitions.156 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, given the enduring requirement of a breach of duty 
under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, as discussed in Section II 
supra, the case of SEC v. Dorozhko illustrates the gap in U.S. insider 
trading liability through which “true outsiders” of a company may not be 
                                                                                                             
 154 See Karmel, supra note 145, at 100. Controversy over whether the statutory 
definition of insider trading should be limited to prohibiting one from “use” of the 
information in trading or merely “possession” of it resulted in deadlock, and no definition 
was created. Thomas Lee Hazen, United States v. Chestman—Trading Securities on the 
Basis of Nonpublic Information in Advance of a Tender Offer, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 595, 
615 (1991). 
 155 Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a 
Global Economy, 37 IND. L. REV. 141, 144 (2003) (“In response to these corporate 
debacles (and to Enron in particular), Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”); Mark 
Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 632 (December 2003) (noting that 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a reaction to “Enron-era scandals”); Robert 
Wright, Enron: The Ambitious and the Greedy, 16 W.R.L.S.I. 71, 72 (2003)(“As it turns 
out, Enron and the high-risk accounting practices that allowed it to inflate shareholder 
equity by $ 1.2 billion was just the tip of the iceberg; similar scandals were soon 
discovered at WorldCom and Global Crossing. And the corporate malfeasance did not 
stop there: some 250 American public companies will have to restate their accounts this 
year, compared with only 92 in 1997 and three in 1981. The United States Congress 
responded. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act became law in July 2002, making sweeping changes 
to American securities law . . . .”). 
 156 “Virtually every other country that has joined the United States in prohibiting 
trading on the basis of material, non-public information has done so through statutes that 
define with specificity such terms as “insider” and “inside information” as well as the 
circumstances in which trading is prohibited . . . The United States stands alone in 
allowing judges to develop a common law prohibition against insider trading.”  Painter 
et. al, supra note 144, at 210. 
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held accountable for trading on material non-public information. To the 
contrary, the E.U. recently imposed a scheme of general fairness in the 
marketplace, focusing on the imbalance of information when a trade 
occurs rather than any specific relationship between the parties involved 
and the issuer, as discussed in Section III supra. Until the Supreme Court 
expands its previous interpretation or Congress acts to amend and update 
the law, data thieves in the U.S. may continue to steal and trade on 
material non-public information without fear of reprisal under the 
Exchange Act. 
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National Legislation Implementing the European Union 
Directive 2003/6/EC on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation 
Reference and Authority  
 
                                                 
      1 Austrian Stock Exchange Act Art. 48q. 
 2 Id. at Art. 48q(4). 
 3 The exchange operating company may be any legal entity that manages 
and/or operates a regulated market or anyone who operates any other securities 
exchange or general commodities exchange.  Id. at Art. 2. 
 4 Id. at Art. 48q(3). 
 5 Id. at Art. 48b(1). 
 6 Id. at Art. 48b(3). 
 7 Austrian Stock Exchange Act 48b(4).  In the case of a legal entity, those 
natural persons shall be considered insiders who were involved in the decision to 
carry out a transaction for the account of the legal entity.  Id.   
 8 Id. at Art. 48b(2).   
 9  Id. at Art. 48a(1)(1). 
 10  Id. at Art. 48b(1). 
 11  Id. at Art. 48b(2).  A “daily rate” is determined based on the economic 
circumstances of the perpetrator and can be set between €2 and €500.  Austrian 
Penal Code Art. 19(2). 
 12  Law on the Supervision of the Financial Sector and on Financial 
Services, Chapt. II, Art. 48(3). 
 13  Id. at Art. 25 § 1(a).  Where the individual involved in this situation is a 
legal entity, this prohibition also applies to the natural persons who partake in 
the decision to carry out the transaction on behalf of the legal entity involved.  
Id. at Art. 25 § 2.   
 14  Id. at Art. 25 § 1(b). 
 15  Id. at Art. 25 § 1(c). 
 16  Law on the Supervision of the Financial Sector and on Financial 
Services, Chapt. II, Art. 2 § 14. 
 17  Id. at Art. 36 § 2. 
 18  Id. at Art. 40 §§ 1–3. 
 19  Id. at Art. 43; Committee of European Securities Regulators, Report on 
Administrative Measures and Sanctions as well as the Criminal Sanctions 
available in Member States under the Market Abuse Directive (Oct. 17, 2007).  
An offender also may be ordered to pay a fine of up to triple the capital gain that 
he has obtained through his infringement.  Id. 
 20  Law on the Supervision of the Financial Sector and on Financial 
Services, Chapt. II, Art. 622-1.   
 21  Where the person is a legal person, the described prohibitions also apply 
to natural persons taking part in the decision to effect the transaction on behalf 
of such legal person.  Id. at Art. 622-2.   
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. at Art. 621-1. Information is deemed to be precise if it indicates a set 
of circumstances or event that has occurred or is likely to occur and a conclusion 
may be drawn as to the possible effect of such set of circumstances or event on 
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the prices of financial instruments or related financial instruments. Information 
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
prices of financial instruments or related derivative financial instruments is 
information that a reasonable investor would be likely to use as part of the basis 
of his investment decisions.  Id.   
 25  Monetary and Financial Code (2005) L621-14.  Like the SEC power 
within the United States, the AMF may order a person to cease all practices 
contrary to the laws of regulations intended to protect investors from insider 
trading.  This decision can be made public.  Id. 
 26  Id. at L621-15. During AMF enforcement proceedings, the AMF Board 
may suspend the professionals involved in the investigation (which includes 
legal entities, and the natural persons who work on their behalf).  Id. 
 27  Id. at L621-15 III. The sanction decision may be published.  Id. 
 28  Id. at L621-15 III. The monetary penalty involved is to be 
“commensurate with the seriousness of the breaches committed and any 
advantages or profits derived from those breaches.”  Id. 
 29  Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at L465-1. Although the code itself 
does not specify that the transaction must be related to the privileged 
information the individual possessed at the time, this is assumed by practitioners 
in France. Bender, Doing Business in France §14.05 (2007). 
 30  Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at L465-1. 
 31  Id. at L465-3.   
 32  Id. at L465-1. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id. at L465-1.   
 35  Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at L465-1. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Securities Trading Act (“WpHG”) § 39(2) no.3-4. Here, there is no 
requirement of any particular affiliation (to the issuer, through the person’s 
employment, or to a conspiracy), as is required to violate the criminal 
counterparts of these laws.   
 38  Id. at § 39. 
 39  Id. at § 14(1) no. 1. Violation of the insider dealing provision can be 
prosecuted for a negligent state of mind.  Id. at § 38(4). However, the 
punishment imposed for violations of intentional insider dealing can be up to 
five times higher than merely negligent conduct.  Id. at § 38(1) no.1.   
 40  Id. at § 14(1) no. 2. It should be noted that the provisions prohibiting the 
disclosure of inside information and tipping require an intentional act.  Id. at § 
38 (1) no. 2. 
 41  Id. at §14(1) no. 3. 
 42  If, however, an offence is committed through negligence, the punishment 
shall not exceed one year in prison or a criminal fine. Monetary and Financial 
Code (2005) at § 38(4). 
 43  Id. at § 38.   
 44  Id. at §13(1).  Information is “likely to have a significant effect on the 
stock exchange or market price” when a reasonable investor would take the 
information into account for investment decisions.  Id. at §13(1).   
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 45  Id. at §§ 5(1)-(2).  This prohibition does not apply to any transaction 
conducted in the discharge of an obligation to acquire or dispose of any financial 
instrument, which has become due, and results from an agreement concluded 
before the person concerned came into possession of the relevant inside 
information.  Id. at § 5(5). 
 46  Id. at § 5(3)(a).  If the person falling into any of the above four categories 
is a legal entity, then any natural person who takes part in the decision to carry 
out, for the account of the legal entity, any transaction in financial instruments is 
also considered an insider.  Id. at § 5(3)(b).   
 47  Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at § 5(3)(c). 
 48  Id. at § 2(1). 
 49  Monetary and Financial Code (2005) at  § 41(c). 
 50  Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2005, § 
33(1)(a).  The guilty party shall pay for any loss sustained by the counterparty 
by reason of a difference between the price at which the relevant financial 
instruments were traded and the price at which they would have been likely to 
have been traded if the relevant information was generally available.  Id. 
 51  Id. at § 33(1)(b). 
 52  Irish Market Abuse Law, § 41. 
 53  Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2005, 
§ 32. 
 54  Irish Market Abuse Law, § 49. 
 55  Unified Financial Act Art. 187-bis(1). 
 56  Id. at Art. 187-bis(2). 
 57  Id. at Art. 187-bis(4). 
 58  Id. at Art. 181(1)-(4).   
 59  Id. at 187-bis(1); Art. 39(3) of Law 262/2005.  The fine may be increased 
by three to ten times the product of the offense or the profit therefrom when the 
maximum fine appears inadequate in view of seriousness of the offense, the 
personal situation of the guilty party, or the magnitude of the product of the 
offense or the profit therefrom.  Unified Financial Act, Art. 187(2).  Pecuniary 
administrative sanctions for insider trading always include the confiscation of 
the product of the offense or the profit therefrom and the property used to 
commit it.  If it is not possible to  recover the proceeds or profit, a sum of money 
or property of equivalent value may be confiscated.  Unified Financial Act, Art. 
187(6).   
 60  Unified Financial Act at Art. 187(4). 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. at Art. 184. 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. at Art. 184(1); Art. 39(1) of Law 262/2005.  The fine may be 
increased by the court to three to ten times the product of the crime or the profit 
therefrom when the maximum fine appears inadequate in view of the 
seriousness of the offense, the personal situation of the guilty party, or the 
magnitude of the product of the crime or the profit therefrom.  Unified Financial 
Act, Art. 184(3). 
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 65  Unified Financial Act Art. 187.  Where it is not possible to recover the 
proceeds or profit, a sum of money or property of equivalent value may be 
confiscated.  Id.   
 66  Id. at Art. 186.  These accessory penalties remain in force for between six 
months and two years.  C.P. Book I, Title II, Chapter II, Section III, Art. 28, 30, 
32(2), 32(3). 
 67  Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, Ch. 8 § 118.  The conduct is 
proscribed whether it occurs in relation to a person’s affirmative action or 
inaction.  Id. at § 130A(3).   
 68  Id. at § 118B.   
 69  Id. at §§ 118C(1)-(2).   
 70  Id. at § 123.  In deciding the proper penalty, the FSA looks to whether 
the conduct had an adverse effect on the market, the extent to which the conduct 
was deliberate or reckless, and whether the guilty party is a person or business 
entity.  Id. at § 124.   
 71  Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000, Ch. 8 § 123(3). 
 72  Id. at § 124(7).  
 73  Criminal Justice Act 1993, Ch. 36 § 52.   
 74  Id. at § 57(2).   
 75  Id. at §§ 56(1); 60(4).   
 76  Id. at § 61(1)(b).   
 77  Id. at § 61(1)(a).   
